

# Bio Terror Bible

## EXPOSING THE COMING BIO-TERROR PANDEMIC

**BIOTERRORBIBLE.COM:** Based on the evidence uncovered by the [Sunshine Project](#), it appears that the U.S. is actively attempting to piece together the DNA of the 1918 Spanish Flu which killed millions. Although this scientific venture is for "defensive" purposes, the U.S. clearly has a bio-weapons agenda and timeline that they are attempting to adhere to. Should a bio-terror attack and subsequent pandemic occur, the Spanish Flu may be the culprit all thanks to an offensive bio-weapons program that is clearly out of control.

**Title:** Lethal Virus From 1918 Genetically Reconstructed

**Date:** October 9, 2003

**Source:** [Sunshine Project](#)

**Abstract:** The 'Spanish Flu' influenza virus that killed 20-40 million people in 1918 is currently under reconstruction. Several genes of the extraordinarily lethal 1918 flu virus have been isolated and introduced into contemporary flu strains. These proved to be lethal for mice, while virus constructs with genes from a current flu virus types had hardly any effect. These experiments may easily be abused for military purposes, but provide little benefit from a medical or public health point of view.

The 1918 Spanish Flu was highly infectious and – in comparison to contemporary flu viruses – killed a very high percentage of those infected, including many younger people. The Spanish Flu alone caused the medium life expectancy in the US in 1918 to drop by 10 years. Hence, flu viruses are perceived today as a serious biological warfare threat. Just two weeks ago, a 15 million dollar research grant was awarded in the US to develop protective measures especially against a bioterrorist attack with flu viruses.

Despite the very dangerous nature of the 1918 virus, efforts to reconstruct it started in the mid 1990s, when Dr Jeffrey Taubenberger from the US Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Washington DC succeeded in recovering and sequencing fragments of the viral RNA from preserved tissues of 1918 victims. In the current issue of the scientific journal Emerging Infectious Diseases new genetic details of the 1918 flu virus will be published.

But after (partially) unravelling the genetic sequence of the virus, the scientists went a step further and began bringing the Spanish flu back to life. Unnoticed by the public, they succeeded in creating a live virus containing two 1918 genes that proved to be very lethal in animal experiments. This experiment is only one genetic step away from taking the 1918 demon entirely out of the bottle.

A resuscitation of the Spanish flu is neither necessary nor warranted from a public health point of view. Allegedly, the recent experiments sought to test the efficacy of existing antiviral drugs on the 1918 construct. But there is little need for antiviral drugs against the 1918 strain if the 1918 strain had not been recreated in the first place "It simply does not make any scientific sense to create a new threat just to develop new countermeasures against it." says Jan van Aken, biologist with the Sunshine Project, "Genetic characterization of influenza strains has important biomedical applications. But it is not justifiable to recreate this particularly dangerous eradicated strain that could wreak havoc if released, deliberately or accidentally."

Construction of new maximum security (BSL-4) laboratories for biodefense research has been justified in part by citing the potential of the Spanish Flu as a biological weapon. Influenza usually requires a low level of containment; but when scientists begin recombining virulence-related genes, the danger dramatically increases. The University of Texas Medical Branch's BSL-4 plans influenza 'gene reassortment' experiments in maximum containment. "This kind of research is creating a vicious

circle, and could prompt a race by biodefense scientists to genetic engineer unthinkable diseases", says Edward Hammond of the Sunshine Project, "What disease comes after influenza? Biodefense laboratories must not become self-fulfilling prophesy centers. The world does not need biodefense programs to create a 'genetically engineered disease gap'."

From an arms control perspective it appears to be particularly sensitive if a military research institution embarks on a project that aims at constructing more dangerous pathogens. "If Jeffery Taubenberger worked in a Chinese, Russian or Iranian laboratory, his work might well be seen as the 'smoking gun' of an offensive biowarfare program," says van Aken.

A Sunshine Project briefing paper on the '[Reconstruction of the Spanish influenza virus](#)' provides further details and a comprehensive literature list ([Sunshine Project, 2003](#)).

**Title:** Biosafety Irregularity In Spanish Flu Experiments: Highlights The Need to Strengthen Biodefense Transparency

**Date:** October 21, 2003

**Source:** [Sunshine Project](#)

**Abstract:** Genetic experiments to recreate one of the most devastating viruses of the past century were not reviewed or approved by a biosafety committee. The University of Georgia claims that it was too troublesome to convene its Institutional Biosafety Committee to review research to genetically reconstruct the Spanish flu. Instead, the University signed off on the experiments based on ad hoc talks between only four members of its biosafety committee. As a result, no minutes were taken to describe safety review of the experiments. In fact, by not convening its committee, Georgia's actions ensured that there was no timely opportunity to raise concerns at all.

The case demonstrates a severe weakness in the public disclosure provisions of federal research rules (the NIH Guidelines) and underscores the need for mandatory committee-level (or higher) review of research projects with disease agents. By approving the experiments with an ad hoc subcommittee, requirements for public disclosure were avoided. The existence of the experiments only came to light through journal articles. According to Edward Hammond of the Sunshine Project, "Genetic engineering of bioweapons agents has national and international implications for health, biosafety, and security. But Georgia shied away from these and simply rubber-stamped the Pentagon-led project to recreate the Spanish flu."

More stringent, more public review is required, says Hammond, "Weighing the merits and hazards of these kinds of experiments requires open discussion. Georgia's claim that reconstituting Spanish flu doesn't merit a biosafety committee meeting is scandalous, and will diminish public trust in the biosafety committee system."

In 1918-19, the Spanish flu killed 20-40 million people worldwide. In the US, deaths from the flu strain resulted in a 10 year drop in life expectancy. Recreating the deadly flu may create international unease, in particular because of the leadership of the US military in the project. The experiments were described by the Sunshine Project on October 9th. (See News Release "[Lethal Virus from 1918 Genetically Reconstructed](#)" and the briefing paper "[Recreating the Spanish flu?](#)", both available online.)

The Spanish flu reconstruction began at a University of Georgia biosafety level three (BSL-3) facility in 1999. Researchers from US universities, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) are involved. The lab specializes in diseases of poultry, including avian influenza. The Sunshine Project has confirmed - and reconfirmed - under the Freedom of Information Act that USDA has no biosafety committee minutes related to the experiments. The Project also directly contacted the University of Georgia and requested Institutional Biosafety Committee meeting minutes that are required by the NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research. Georgia's Biosafety Officer stated that no minutes exist.

Scientists have recently begun to accept the need to reinforce the Institutional Biosafety Committee system established under the NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research. But the discussion,

including that in a recent report on biosafety by the National Academies of Science, is out of balance because it is taking place almost exclusively between scientists, government regulators, and the Pentagon.

"There is a need to make more room at the table. The public has a right to help determine if, and under what conditions, risky research proceeds," says Hammond, "Biosafety review must be a matter of law, and public access provisions of federal research rules must be strengthened. Otherwise, risky experiments such as this one will take place with little or no transparency, and that will decrease international security and create environmental and health risks."

A Sunshine Project briefing paper on the '[Reconstruction of the Spanish influenza virus](#)' provides further details and a comprehensive literature list ([Sunshine Project, 2003](#)).

**Title:** Disease By Design: 1918 "Spanish" Flu Resurrection Creates Major Safety And Security Risks

**Date:** October 5, 2005

**Source:** [Sunshine Project](#)

**Abstract:** The resurrection of 1918 influenza has plunged the world closer to a flu pandemic and to a biodefense race scarcely separable from an offensive one, according to the Sunshine Project, a biological weapons watchdog.

"There was no compelling reason to recreate 1918 flu and plenty of good reasons not to. Instead of a dead bug, now there are live 1918 flu types in several places, with more such strains sure to come in more places," says Sunshine Project Director Edward Hammond, "The US government has done a great misdeed by endorsing and encouraging the deliberate creation of extremely dangerous new viruses. The 1918 experiments will be replicated and adapted, and the ability to perform them will proliferate, meaning that the possibility of man-made disaster, either accidental or deliberate, has risen for the entire world."

The 1918 experiments are part of the US biodefense program and are of no practical value in responding to outbreaks of "bird flu" (H5N1). The 1918 virus is a different type (H1N1) of influenza than "bird flu". 1918 flu is more than eighty five years old and no longer exists in nature, posing no natural threat. While it is reasonable to determine the genetic sequence of 1918 and other extinct influenza strains, there is no valid reason to recreate the virulent virus, as the risks far outweigh the benefits.

But the most significant story isn't Tumpey, Taubenberger, and colleagues. It is the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) attitude about the experiments and its implications. "The biggest news about resurrecting 1918 flu is the US government's enthusiastic embrace of designer disease and the impact that it will have on our future," says Hammond, "By encouraging genetic riffs on influenza and other viruses with the explicit intent of building more dangerous pathogens, CDC is fueling the gathering dangers of competition to discover the worst possibilities of biotechnology applied to bioweapons agents. Some might do it just to keep up with the Americans, resulting in a further blurring of defense and offense and heightening the biological mistrust evident in US foreign policy."

In addition to the potentially broad damage to international security and cooperation in the biological sciences if novel diseases continue to be created, the 1918 experiments heighten the chance that a flu lab will be the source of the next pandemic.

CDC says that it plans to keep its vials of 1918 flu under close guard in one place. But that's a red herring according to the Sunshine Project. Influenza with as many as five 1918 flu genes, and which are potentially pandemic, have already been handled at labs in at least four places other than CDC, including labs in Athens, GA, Winnipeg, MB (Canada), Seattle, WA, and Madison, WI. With the exception of the Canadian lab, none of these facilities has maximum (BSL-4) biological containment, and it is a virtual certainty that more labs will begin 1918 flu work now.

In fact, the only possible source of a new 1918 influenza outbreak is a laboratory. The situation of the 1918 flu is not dissimilar to SARS, whose natural transmission is believed to have been halted. The

experience with SARS accidents is chilling: It has escaped three different labs to date. A 1918 influenza escape would be very likely to take a higher human toll. The US biodefense program has also had a number of lab accidents since 2002, including mishandling of anthrax and plague and laboratory-acquired infections of tularemia. In Russia, a researcher contracted ebola and died last year.

Importantly, human error and equipment failures aren't the only ways for a disease agent to escape a lab - something vividly illustrated by the anthrax letters in the US four years ago. Unlike anthrax, however, 1918 influenza would transmit from human to human.

"We are no safer from a pandemic today than yesterday. In fact, we're in greater danger, not only from influenza; but from the failure of the US to come to grips with and address the threats posed by the research it sponsors, in terms of legislation, ethics, and self-restraint." concludes Hammond ([Sunshine Project, 2005](#)).